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Richard Sidney Sayers (1908-1989) 
 
Alec Cairncross and Charles Goodhart 
 
Abstract 
 
Richard Sayers’s greatest strength was as an economic historian of institutional changes 
within the British financial system, especially relating to the Bank of England, for 
which he became the second official historian covering the years 1891-1944; but also 
writing the histories of Lloyds and Gilletts, and a wider study entitled Financial Policy, 
1939-45. Nevertheless, he is best known for two other contributions. First, his textbook, 
Modern Banking, remained required reading on this subject for all British 
undergraduates from 1937 until the early 1970s; second, he played the major role in the 
domestic monetary analysis of the Radcliffe Report (1959). This latter role was often 
not well received, and his historical and institutional approach to the subject began to be 
treated as unfashionable and outdated, so that Sayers, always a lone introvert, had a 
somewhat sad end to his life. 
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Alec Cairncross (1911-1998) was a distinguished economist and public servant. His 
undergraduate degree was in economics at the University of Glasgow followed by a 
doctorate from Cambridge. Returning to Glasgow, he was appointed lecturer in 
economics in 1935 and worked in various government departments during and after the 
Second World War. He became Professor of Applied Economics at Glasgow in 1951, 
where his focus was on the factors which drive urban and industrial change. Cairncross 
became an economic adviser to the Treasury in 1961, was knighted in 1967 and was 
appointed Master of St Peter’s College, Oxford, in 1967. He served as Chancellor of 
Glasgow from 1972 to 1996. Amongst his most important publications were 
Introduction to Economics (1944; six editions) and Years of Recovery: British 
Economic Policy, 1945-1951 (1985). 
 
Charles Goodhart 
 
Charles Goodhart, CBE, FBA, is Emeritus Professor of Banking and Finance with the 
Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics (LSE), having previously, 
1987-2005, been its Deputy Director. Until his retirement in 2002, he had been the 
Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at LSE since 1985. Before then, he 
had worked at the Bank of England for seventeen years as a monetary adviser, 
becoming a Chief Adviser in 1980. In 1997 he was appointed one of the outside 
independent members of the Bank of England’s new Monetary Policy Committee until 
May 2000. Earlier he had taught at Cambridge and LSE. Besides numerous articles, he 
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has written a graduate monetary textbook, several books on monetary analysis and 
history, and on banking regulation. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Richard Sidney Sayers (1908-1989) 
 
Alec Cairncross and Charles Goodhart 
 
1   Introduction1 
 
The Radcliffe Report (1959), otherwise known as the Committee on the Working of the 
Monetary System (HMSO Command 827, August), was, and remains, the most 
important examination of monetary affairs in the UK in the decades since the Second 
World War. The Committee was appointed (by Treasury Minute) on 3 May, 1957; it 
began taking evidence on 11 July, 1957, and the final date on which evidence was taken 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is derived from Cairncross (1991) and adapted by Charles Goodhart with 
the permission of the British Academy. In preparing this memoir I [Cairncross] have 
drawn heavily on the recollections of Leslie Pressnell and Stuart Wilson and have been 
greatly assisted by Sayers’s daughter, Jennifer, his son, Michael, his sister, Mrs 
Whitaker, and his younger brother Walter. Others who have provided useful 
information include Theo Barker, Alan Day, Henry Phelps Brown and the Revd Stella 
Taylor. 
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was 30 April, 1959; the Report was issued in August. The key members of the Report 
were Lord Radcliffe, and the two economists on the Committee, Alec Cairncross and 
Richard Sayers, though the Secretary, Robert Armstrong, also played an important role 
behind the scenes. 
 
Cairncross, later knighted (1967), was a leading macroeconomist of the day, who had 
published a widely-used textbook on macroeconomics (Introduction to Economics, 
1944, sixth edition 1982), but was not a monetary specialist. At this time, Sayers was 
the preeminent money and banking specialist economist in the UK. His best-known 
work was his textbook, Modern Banking, whose first edition was in 1938, and whose 
final edition (seventh) came out in 1967. So, it was always going to be likely that Sayers 
would be chosen as the monetary specialist to be on the Radcliffe Committee. Indeed, 
these three main protagonists, Radcliffe himself, Cairncross and Sayers, dominated the 
questioning and both the analysis and substance in the subsequent Report. In this 
exercise, Cairncross worked for slightly over two years in continuous close conjunction 
with Sayers. 
 
So when Sayers died in 1989, Cairncross was the natural choice to write the article-
length Memoir on his life for the British Academy. Cairncross wrote this Memoir 
shortly after Sayers’s death, published by the Academy in 1991, and had the 
advantages, not only of their prior close co-operation, but of immediacy and access to 
colleagues, whilst memories of Sayers remained fresh. This means that Cairncross’s 
Memoir, republished below, with hardly any alterations (thanking the British Academy 
for their agreement to allow this), contains much more detail than could be put together 
at this much later date, when many of those close to Sayers at the time have gone. 
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Perhaps the only advantage that one has, compared with Cairncross’s excellent Memoir, 
is the lapse of time which can allow for a slightly greater perspective, and also may 
relax some of the constraints about referring to his disposition and personal life. 
 
The conclusions of Radcliffe were contentious. In contrast to the relatively simple 
proposals and arguments of the growing band of monetarists, under the developing 
influence of Milton Friedman in the USA, the Radcliffe Report was circumspect and 
cautious in its arguments about what monetary policy should, or could, do and sought to 
replace attention on measureable quantities of monetary aggregates with a focus on a 
largely unmeasurable, indeed hard to define, concept of liquidity. Thus, in the 
concluding chapter of the Report (Chapter XII, paragraph 981), the Report states: 
 
Secondly, the factor which monetary policy should seek to influence or control is 
something that reaches beyond what is known as the “supply of money”. It is nothing 
less than the state of liquidity of the whole economy. The behaviour of our economy – 
in particular, the moderation or pressure of demand from time to time – is influenced by 
the relative liquidity of potential spenders at any one time, and thus, at one remove, by 
the liquidity of those who might act as lenders to them or subscribers to their funds. 
 
While the downgrading of the monetary aggregates, and the quantity theory of money, 
infuriated the monetarists, the fuzziness and lack of clarity of the proposed alternative 
concentration on ‘liquidity’ left even the likely supporters of such an approach more 
than a little bemused. Roger Alford, Sayers’s colleague at LSE, commented in his 
subsequent book, Life and LSE (Alford 2009: 223), as follows: 
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The Report was not well received; it was widely felt to lack a clear and workable 
framework for monetary policy and this criticism was a great disappointment to 
Richard. I can remember Lionel Robbins’s seminars in the Graham Wallas Room at 
which the Report was discussed; Richard sat at the back and at every effort to clarify 
what the Report was really saying, he pursed his lips and shook his head gloomily, 
implying that yet another speaker had missed the point. 
 
In some respects, with the collapsing reliability of demand for money functions in the 
1980s, the subsequent decline of interest in the monetary aggregates, and the growth of 
‘shadow banking’, the emphasis of Radcliffe on a wider but fuzzier concept of liquidity 
might be better received now than it was in the 1960s and 1970s, when monetarism was 
the fashionable new idea. But in other respects the methodology and approach that 
Sayers espoused has been on a steady downhill path since then. His great strength was 
always as a historian, and his approach to monetary, financial and banking issues was 
descriptive, institutional and historical, which allowed considerable reliance on 
quantitative data, but eschewed econometrics, and included virtually no maths or 
equations whatsoever. This approach had a long pedigree at LSE with Barrett Whale 
and Sir Theodore Gregory, but this institutional/historical approach became increasingly 
under threat, not only at universities elsewhere, but even at LSE over the course of 
subsequent decades. One of the results of this has been that Sayers’s main textbook, 
Modern Banking, which had been read by almost every economics undergraduate in the 
UK from 1938 to the mid-1970s, is now rarely read or cited. 
 
Sayers’s reputation as a money and banking historian remains, however, undiminished, 
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and the many historical works that he produced, which are described in Cairncross’s 
Memoir – notably Bank of England Operations, 1890-1914, Financial Policy, 1939-45, 
Central Banking after Bagehot, Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking, Gilletts 
in the London Money Market, andThe Bank of England, 1891-1944 – remain the most 
important accounts of such historical developments. Also, the many current studies 
which he did then, often in conjunction with his student, J.S.G. Wilson, e.g. on Banking 
in the British Commonwealth, although somewhat stodgy, remain valuable documents 
about how the institutional set-up of central banks and banks in a wide variety of 
countries operated at the time. So Sayers remains a foremost banking historian. 
 
For the rest, he was even perceived at the time as becoming somewhat old fashioned, 
and the historical/institutional approach has been largely put on one side to be replaced 
by much more rigorous mathematical models, though ones which tend to assume a 
given and constant institutional background and whose underlying assumptions often 
hardly bear detailed scrutiny. 
 
In addition to being technically old fashioned, Sayers was not a man to engage in easy 
collegial activities. Face to face he was not an easy person, but he was a great help to 
many during their careers in numerous ways. On paper he was able express a warmth 
that so often eluded him in personal meetings. He was intensely private, withdrawn, 
proud at what he had done, and introverted. I was myself a member of Sayers’s Money 
Group for a couple of years, 1966-1968, at LSE, and I had a good relationship with 
Richard and was able to talk with him on several occasions; but, in general, people 
approached Richard with trepidation, and he did not participate in standard academic 
socialising, as this paragraph from Roger Alford’s book records: 
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In 1968, Richard Sayers retired and there was the customary retirement dinner for him; 
it was felt that, in his withdrawn way, he might decline to attend, so his wife guaranteed 
to get him there on time without him knowing what was coming. It was not a very 
cheerful occasion. Many of us felt that he was retiring as a disappointed man; the 
Radcliffe Report, of which he was a leading figure, had not been well received and had 
failed to make an impact on monetary thinking and monetary policy (Alford 2009: 324). 
 
Things then went from bad to worse. After retirement he left his wife for a woman who 
had been his research assistant for his historical book on Gillett Brothers, thereby 
alienating his family. He ended up in a down-at-heel house at Clacton-on-Sea, 
increasingly concerned that he was losing command of his intellectual faculties, and 
upset that the tradition of historical and monetary scholarship that he had maintained at 
LSE was under threat. It was an unhappy ending for a man who had been a true scholar 
in his chosen field. 
 
2   Early Life 
 
Richard Sidney Sayers was born in Bury St Edmonds in Suffolk on 11 July, 1908. He 
prided himself in afterlife on being a Suffolk man and looked forward to retiring to 
Suffolk. He did in fact move to Long Melford a year or two after his retirement, 
although reluctantly he moved on again later, first to Essex and then to Sussex. 
 
Of the seven children in the family Richard was the fifth. The oldest, a boy, died in 
infancy. Then came a girl, four boys and another girl. Richard’s oldest brother, Frank, 
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worked in Lloyds Bank, whose history Richard subsequently wrote. Another brother 
became a squadron leader in the RAF. Richard was the only one to attend university. 
His older sister, Margaret, who studied economics at night school and may have kindled 
his interest in the subject, might also have gone to university but was unable to take up a 
place at LSE which she won, along with a gold medal, in a Royal Society of Arts 
examination. 
 
The family belonged to the lower-ranking part of the professional class, Sayers’s father, 
Sidney James Sayers, describing himself on the birth certificate as County Council 
Finance Clerk. He had attended night school like his daughter and trained as an 
accountant, working for 40 years as West Suffolk County Accountant in Shire Hall at 
Bury. Something of Sayers’s father’s concern with accounting shows up in his son’s 
precise analysis, in balance sheet terms, of the successive effects of a change in a bank’s 
cash reserves on its lending operations. 
 
Sayers went to a succession of schools in Bury from 1912 to 1926, the last nine of those 
years at West Suffolk County School. He was inclined to speak disparagingly of the 
school despite being Head Prefect for two years (he retained many of the characteristics 
of a Head Prefect all his life). He showed no great interest in sport, although his older 
brothers were in the soccer First XI. But when taunted again and again at the age of 14 
or 15 with his inability to play football and match their achievements, he rounded on the 
pack with a tremendous outburst of temper, pledging his selection on merit by a fixed 
date when he would play and play well. Although he was listened to with scorn and 
disbelief, he abandoned his books, trained regularly and hard, took all the knocks 
without complaint and was duly selected to play by the date he had set without any 
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favouritism on the part of the selectors. He played in one game with grit and 
determination, then abandoned football for good, telling the headmaster the full story 
and asking that he should never again be selected. ‘My studies’ he declared ‘are more 
important’. 
 
When it was decided to enter him for Cambridge, the ‘local university’, he found it 
necessary to go to a crammer for ‘Little-Go’ as he had no Latin. He had, however, been 
able to begin the study of economics in his final year and in the summer of 1926, before 
he went up to Cambridge, he was already reading Marshall and Taussig in preparation 
for Part I of the Economics Tripos. In December of the previous year he had sat the 
Scholarship Examination for Gonville and Caius College and been placed in the 
Exhibition Class in History. Neither Caius nor St John’s (to which he had also applied) 
could take him before 1927 but he was offered and accepted a place at St Catherine’s. 
 
Throughout his life Sayers hesitated between economics and history and the hesitation 
was evident in his proposed course of study at Cambridge. He had intended to take Part 
I of the Tripos in Economics and Part II in History but ended up taking both Parts of the 
Economics Tripos, graduating in 1929 with a First in Part II. Nevertheless, he retained 
his interest in history and his closest associations when on the staff of LSE were with 
scholars who showed the same liking for a combination of history and economics: 
Barrett Whale and Theodore Gregory in pre-war days and T.S. Ashton after the war. 
 
At Cambridge he was tutored by Gerald Shove, now a rather obscure figure but in his 
day one of the most powerful and original minds in economics. Sayers attended 
Keynes’s lectures at a time when he was lecturing from the proofs of A Treatise on 
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Money and was duly awed by the great man who made him a member of his Monday 
night ‘Keynes Club’. In later life, however, he was a follower of Dennis Robertson 
rather than of Keynes and it was to Robertson that he habitually sent drafts of his work 
before publication. 
 
During his studies at Cambridge Sayers became attached to an old friend and form-mate 
from Bury, Millicent Hodson (the school was coeducational) and in September 1930, a 
year after graduation, they were married in Bury Cathedral. He then embarked on a year 
of graduate study at Cambridge while his wife taught in a school in Dry Drayton. Later, 
she devoted herself to helping her husband with his writing and bringing up two 
children, a boy and girl. Sayers did not involve her much in academic contacts and, in 
post-war years at least, his colleagues hardly ever saw her. 
 
3   Starting as an Academic 
 
In 1931 Sayers was appointed as an Assistant Lecturer at LSE where his main duty was 
to assist Barrett Whale. It was an association to which he looked back with pleasure for 
‘the rich and generous source of ideas, inspiration and encouragement’ (Sayers quoted 
in Robertson 1951: 440) that Barrett Whale provided and the debt was acknowledged 
wholeheartedly in successive editions of Modern Banking. It was at LSE that Sayers 
began to learn about banking, working with Barrett Whale and Gregory and taking part 
in seminars with a team from the City who later co-operated to produce a very early 
study of comparative banking in a variety of countries entitled Commercial Banking 
Legislation and Control (Allen et al. 1938). 
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Sayers remained at LSE for four years before moving to Oxford as a college lecturer, 
holding appointments at Corpus Christi, Exeter and Pembroke and becoming a Fellow 
of Pembroke in 1939. He had used his time at LSE to conduct extensive research on 
monetary policy before the First World War, making thorough use of money market 
reports in The Economist and The Statist but without the access to Bank of England 
records subsequently accorded to Clapham when preparing his official history of the 
Bank up to 1914. He had applied, with Gregory’s help, to be allowed to consult the 
Bank’s records and, although Montagu Norman refused, it seems to have been this that 
put into his head the idea of having an academic like Clapham prepare a history of the 
Bank for its 250th anniversary in 1944. If so, Sayers played a key part in opening up the 
archives of the Bank. 
 
Bank of England Operations, 1890-1914, which was published in 1936 when Sayers 
was already in Oxford, is not perhaps one of his major works but it established his 
reputation as a monetary historian. Unfortunately, the type of the book was destroyed in 
wartime bombing and this – and the war itself – limited the attention it received. In the 
originality and meticulousness of the research, the organization of the material and the 
clarity and elegance of the exposition it is a model of its kind. The evidence is carefully 
marshalled from scattered sources and woven into a clear line of argument with no 
attempt to claim more than can be demonstrated. 
 
Sayers provided convincing evidence of the wide difference between the conventional 
view of the working of the pre-war gold standard and the actual course of events. 
Instead of a smooth and more or less automatic mechanism of adjustment to balance of 
payments pressures through variations in Bank Rate, Sayers showed that even in its 
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heyday the international gold standard ‘worked under disadvantages of the same kind, 
though not to the same degree, as [regimes] of post-war years’. With tariffs, war debts, 
reparations and political insecurity it was ‘remarkable that the gold standard ever 
worked at all’ (ibid., xx-xxi). ‘Even if there was a much smaller supply of 
internationally mobile funds...our fathers and grandfathers must have been less 
sensitive, less ready to take fright at the succession of shocks which occurred’ (ibid., 
xxii). 
 
Sayers went on to show what difficulties the Bank of England had in maintaining the 
convertibility of the currency. It could neither afford large reserves nor was its power 
over market rates of interest assured. On the contrary, it had to resort to all kinds of 
shifts to bring rates closer to Bank Rate and find other ingenious devices to protect its 
gold reserves by placing obstacles in the way of withdrawals. 
 
Once at Oxford, Sayers embarked on the more ambitious project of writing a textbook 
on Modern Banking. First published in 1938, this was and remained the outstanding 
textbook on banking operations and on the practical and institutional aspects of banking. 
A strong motive in writing it, he once remarked, was the approaching birth of his first 
child and the usefulness of additional income; this was by no means the only occasion 
on which he responded to the prospect of a flow of royalties. 
 
It was written at a time of upheavals both in theory and in economic activity. There was 
an intense interest in monetary problems and never-ending controversy over the 
revolutionary new ideas that kept appearing. The Macmillan Committee had issued its 
report at the beginning of the decade. Book after book on money and banking by 
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Keynes, Robertson, Hawtrey and other leading economists was published in the next 
few years. It was no mean task in these circumstances to synthesize and summarize 
‘current theory’ and produce what Sayers described as a ‘restatement of ideas which are 
the subject of agreement among most economists’; the ‘restatement’ required the same 
kind of intellectual effort as the works synthesized. Sayers’s aim was to write a textbook 
on banking that would help honours students ‘to understand how this important part of 
the economic system really works nowadays’. These comments were included in the 
Preface to the first edition of Modern Banking in 1938, but were restated in the Preface 
to the first few editions written after the war, notably on page six of the Preface to the 
third edition published in 1951; this indicates that Sayers himself attached particular 
significance to these two passages. In the volume, Sayers confined himself largely to 
English institutions with occasional references to American practice but little on other 
countries except a chapter on banking in the developing countries. In the first edition he 
also dealt with the international monetary system, the stock market and the 
nationalization of the banks but these chapters had largely disappeared by the third 
edition in 1951. 
 
With Modern Banking Sayers became an internationally recognized economist. The 
book was for many years the standard work in Britain and indeed in many other 
countries, ran to seven editions, each largely rewritten. The last, in 1967, was said a few 
years ago to be still in use in India. 
 
Although Sayers made little claim to originality, no good textbook can be a mere 
summary of other people’s ideas and Modern Banking, which was decidedly a good 
textbook, gave expression to many original thoughts that are prominent in Sayers’s later 
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writings. By the second page he was already presaging that emphasis on liquidity which 
some readers of the Radcliffe Report were later to find so baffling: ‘The economic 
significance of a change in the supply of money’, he maintained, ‘is based on the 
disturbance of the liquidity-distribution of the public’s assets’ (ibid., 2). By page 3 he 
was explaining how the supply of money can respond to a change in the demand for it, 
as when an individual is moved to borrow from a bank in order to make an 
advantageous purchase. Another example occurs in his discussion of the interaction of 
short- and long-term rates of interest. Well before Mr Dalton, he urged that ‘to 
maximize the effect in pushing up gilt-edged prices...the banking policy of low short-
term rates should be accompanied by propaganda such as we had in 1932’ (ibid., 155). 
Finally, there is an indication of his later scepticism about monetary policy in his 
statement that ‘I know of no case in monetary history of a dear money policy alone 
producing a general deflation of money incomes’, followed within a couple of sentences 
by the apparently contradictory judgment on Bank Rate that ‘for producing a general 
revision of money incomes it is a halting, clumsy, indeed a brutal, instrument’ (ibid., 
164). 
 
In the years immediately before the war Sayers became involved in the work of the 
Oxford Economists’ Research Group which sought to establish empirically whether 
businessmen followed the practices which seemed self-evidently rational to economic 
theorists. Sayers’s part was to prepare a summary of the replies from a large number of 
businessmen to enquiries as to their reactions to changes in interest rates when deciding 
on capital expenditure (Sayers 1940). In 1951 when this and other papers were reprinted 
in Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism Sayers contributed a new paper, ‘Business 
Men and the Terms of Borrowing’ (Sayers 1951), which threw even more doubt on the 
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influence of changes in interest rates in controlling investment. 
 
4   Wartime and then LSE 
 
In wartime Sayers worked in the Ministry of Supply where his duties carried him into 
the hush-hush area of the atomic bomb. He was concerned with the development of 
uranium supplies and was one of the negotiating team sent to Washington in 1944. His 
part in the preparation of a joint report is highly praised by the official historian who 
noted Sayers’s intellectual powers, literary abiity, tact and good temper, all of which 
contributed to an excellent draft report. 
 
When the war was over he was persuaded by James Meade to join the Economic 
Section of the Cabinet Office and remained there for two years as a joint Deputy 
Director alongside Marcus Fleming. While Fleming concentrated largely on external 
economic policy, Sayers dealt with domestic issues, including the price and investment 
policy of the nationalized industries (he took a particular interest in transport charges), 
wage policy (here he laid great stress on education and persuasion much as he had done 
in relation to long-term interest rates) and industrial policy generally. In the summer of 
1946 he was brought in on external economic policy and briefed the Lord President in 
favour of maximum blocking of sterling balances and full use of IMF facilities. Later in 
the year he was sent to Paris to help Sir David Waley (not that Waley wanted any help) 
in discussions on financing arrangements for intra-European trade. 
 
When Sayers joined the Economic Section as Deputy Director he seems to have 
contemplated a long spell in public service but in 1947 he opted to resume his academic 
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career, accepting appointment as Sir Ernest Cassel Professor of Economics at the 
London School of Economics (LSE). There he remained until he took early retirement – 
as he had long intended – in 1968. 
 
He busied himself with a sketch of the American banking system published in 1948 and 
the preparation of a new edition (the third) of Modern Banking. Thereafter he turned to 
the second of his major works – some would say his best – Financial Policy, 1939-45. 
This was a volume in the series of official histories edited by Sir Keith Hancock and 
perhaps the most difficult and challenging assignment of the entire series. It took over 
five years to complete, appearing finally in 1956. Sir Wilfred Eady, who had been 
Second Secretary in the Treasury in wartime, reviewed it for the Economic Journal and 
had nothing but praise, calling it ‘an exciting book’ (Eady 1957: 494). Brian Tew, in a 
more circumstantial analysis, was even more enthusiastic: ‘The story as it unfolds’, he 
wrote, ‘is so fascinating and so well told that it deserves to be something of a bestseller’ 
(Tew 1957: 504). But the market for histories of financial policy, however exciting, is a 
limited one, especially if they cover the ground in detail and are works of scholarship, 
not vulgarization. In comparison with Modern Banking, Financial Policy remained 
virtually unknown to the professional economist. 
 
It was a study that drew on Sayers’s twin gifts as economist and historian and was 
written with his customary elegance and lucidity. The story revealed how it was left to a 
small group of administrators and professional economists in the Treasury to wrestle 
with momentous issues of the most diverse kind. In telling it, Sayers had two important 
advantages. He had unlimited access to the official files and could consult those 
members of the Treasury team who were still alive. Exceptionally, he was also allowed 
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to let the more prominent members of the group who were wartime recruits and not 
established civil servants – Keynes, Henderson, Robertson and Catto, for example – 
emerge from the shadows of anonymity and be named as the authors of contributions to 
the policy debate. The story could thus be told in full detail and with the added colour 
and life that personalities lent to it. 
 
It was a story in which it was necessary to be quite clear about the role of finance in a 
war economy and Sayers made this his starting point. But it was also a story of political 
pressure: of tensions and their handling; of deciding what policies were feasible and 
sustainable, not just attractive in economic logic; of finding persuasive arguments and 
forming sound and convincing judgments about an uncertain future. Sayers dealt with 
both economic and political issues with great skill and recreated the atmosphere of the 
wartime Treasury, conveying to the reader the sophistication of the arguments 
employed, the relief and satisfaction when negotiations were successful, the frustration 
and disappointment when they failed or were prolonged indefinitely. While the first half 
of the book on the development of domestic policy gave the impression of successful 
outcomes, the latter half on external economic policy was in the words of Brian Tew, ‘a 
depressing chronicle of frustrations’ (Tew 1957: 504). 
 
The fifties were a highly productive period in Sayers’s life. In addition to Financial 
Policy he produced two other books: a collection of essays, most of them written in 
1955-1956, Central Banking after Bagehot, and a full-length study, Lloyds Bank in the 
History of English Banking (both published in 1957). The Lloyds study was his 
favourite book (though not his best) perhaps because it gave full scope to the historian 
in him to dwell on the personalities of bankers rather than the propositions of 
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economists. He also edited Banking in the British Commonwealth (1952) and (with T.S. 
Ashton) a collection of reprints of Papers in English Monetary History. A fourth edition 
of Modern Banking was in the press and appeared in 1958. The spate of books ceased 
after he was appointed a member of the Radcliffe Committee on the Working of the 
Monetary System in the spring of 1957. It was the most important assignment in his 
career and occupied him for over two years. 
 
5   Radcliffe Committee 
 
Sayers played a dominant part in the Committee’s affairs. Since he was the only expert 
on money and banking on the Committee it was inevitable that he should take the lead 
in the more technical parts of its work. The Chairman, Lord Radcliffe, regarded him as 
‘our fast bowler’ and usually brought him on early in the interrogation of witnesses. 
Some complained afterwards that hardly anybody else put questions to them. 
 
What was less clear was what part he would play in the preparation of the Committee’s 
Report. Radcliffe offered no guidance as to who should prepare a draft and to Sayers’s 
embarrassment the Secretary, Robert Armstrong, set about the job and was well on the 
way to completing the draft before anybody knew. Sayers and I [Cairncross] saw no 
possibility of arriving at a satisfactory text by amending the draft and decided that it 
must be quietly set aside. This could not be done, however, without agreement on 
alternative arrangements for the preparation of a report. The Chairman wanted to draft 
the final chapter on the constitutional issues but no other member of the Committee 
aspired to draft any of the other chapters. Sayers and I, therefore, took on the job and 
nobody dissented. He concentrated on the central issues of domestic monetary policy 
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and wrote about two-thirds of the whole while I tackled the trimmings: the introduction, 
the capital market, statistics and international finance. 
 
In the autumn of 1958, in the middle of the Committee’s work, Sayers had an attack of a 
virus akin to polio (probably Coxsackievirus) in the tongue at the end of a visit to the 
United States.2 This affected his speech and made it doubtful whether he would be able 
to continue on the Committee. Fortunately he recovered sufficiently to rejoin it and to 
resume drafting. When the Report appeared in the summer of 1959 it was obvious to 
those in the know that the main ideas in it were his. 
 
This is not the place to re-examine these ideas and the criticisms they encountered. 
Those who reacted most strongly against the Report were the economists who were later 
christened ‘monetarists’. They insisted that there was a fundamental difference between 
money and other financial assets and were highly critical of the Report’s emphasis on 
liquidity as the appropriate focus of policy. The money supply seemed to them more 
measureable and less vague than the state of liquidity. These criticisms made little 
impression on Sayers. The fact that payments are made in money, not in other financial 
assets that can be readily cashed for money, seemed to him beside the point; and he 
would have rejected the notion that policy must always bear on measurable quantities 
like the money supply rather than on confidence, incentives, liquidity, and attitudes that 
are incapable of precise measurement. 
 
                                                          
2
 Infection with Coxsackievirus can produce weakness and paralysis by damaging the 
muscles (not the nerves as in the case of polio) but the muscles generally recover 
completely. 
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What excited most controversy was the apparent belittling of monetary policy. The 
Report seemed to some people to be saying that money did not matter. In fact, it said no 
such thing but warned the authorities not to put too much faith in the power of monetary 
policy. It argued that in dealing with a boom or a slump ‘monetary policy can help, but 
that is all’ (Radcliffe Report 1959: paragraph 514). Of course, if pushed to the extreme 
of a liquidity crisis, the effect would be dramatic and inescapable. In all other 
circumstances it was the limitations of monetary policy that Sayers wishes to 
emphasize. 
 
The views he expressed in the Report of the Committee were not a brand new set of 
ideas flowing from the hearings. On the contrary, many of them – particularly those 
relating to liquidity – can be found in the papers in Central Banking after Bagehot. The 
limitations of Bank Rate, the desirability of steady long-term rates and occasional 
‘changes of gear’ and the need to operate deliberately on the terms of lending across the 
whole financial spectrum, are all expounded in that earlier volume. 
 
Sayers was bitterly disappointed by the reception of the Report – ‘two years of my life – 
two years, wasted!’ he once exclaimed. His teaching at LSE and seminars he conducted 
there on Monday evenings, at which leading City figures were often invited to speak, 
were deeply affected by his reactions to widespread criticism of Radcliffe doctrine. 
 
6   Later Work 
 
His disappointment did not prevent a considerable volume of new work in the 1960s 
and, after his retirement in 1968, in the 1970s. New editions of Modern Banking 
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appeared in 1960, 1964 and 1967. He contributed a study of The Return to Gold in 1925 
to the volume of Studies in the Industrial Revolution edited in 1960 by Leslie Pressnell, 
edited a volume on Banking in Western Europe in 1962 and the Economic Writings of 
James Pennington in 1963 and delivered the R.C. Mills Lecture in Sydney in 1965 on 
‘The Vicissitudes of an Export Economy: Britain Since 1880’. Other work followed in 
1967-1968: A History of Economic Change in England, 1880-1939 (1967); a 
contribution to the OECD volume on Fiscal Policy for a Balanced Economy (1968); 
and a centenary history of Gilletts Discount House, Gilletts in the London Money 
Market (1968). The last of these followed an earlier work, Gilletts, Bankers at Banbury 
and Oxford, written under his supervision by Miss Audrey Taylor (who had held a 
temporary Fellowship at an Oxford college). It had not been Sayers’s intention to write 
the history of the firm but he decided to do so in honour of a much respected banker 
when Ronald Gillett, the head of the firm, died prematurely in 1965, shortly after the 
publication of Miss Taylor’s book. 
 
Apart from the histories of Lloyds and Gilletts, Sayers was much in demand as an 
historian of banking institutions. I can remember being asked about 1970 what the 
chances were of his accepting an invitation to write a history of the Federal Reserve 
System but whether he was ever formally approached I cannot say. What he did 
undertake was the equally demanding task of producing a sequel to Clapham’s history 
of the Bank of England to 1914. This was completed in 1976 in two volumes covering 
the years from 1891 to 1944. To end in 1944 rather than in 1946 with the nationalization 
of the Bank seems rather odd but was presumably intended to allow the narrative to end 
with the 250th anniversary of the foundation of the Bank and with the retirement of 
Montagu Norman from the Governorship after 20 years. 
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Sayers took great pains over the work. He made full use of the Bank’s archives and 
interviewed many of the leading figures, or their relatives, in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, France, Germany and other countries. In digging into the Bank’s 
accounts he was able to use his mastery of balance sheet changes, as he had done in the 
early chapters of Modern Banking, in order to show how monetary policy worked. The 
result was a study on at least the same level of erudition as Clapham’s and superior in 
the ease and elegance of its style, although some have found it less readable. 
 
In covering the period between 1890 and 1914 Sayers was returning in his last book to 
the subject of his first with the advantage of an insider’s view of events. This produced 
no surprises but he was able to avoid a mere repetition of earlier work and to produce a 
more authoritative account. 
 
The treatment of the later period after 1914 adds more to what was previously known in 
several respects. It gives a fuller picture of the Bank’s relationship with government, 
including full details of the conflict with Cunliffe; of Norman’s part in European 
reconstruction and other international dealings of the Bank; and of the Bank’s efforts to 
assist in industrial reconstruction in the 1930s. It is true, as Sidney Pollard maintains in 
one of the few reviews to appear, that political issues count for more in this period, not 
only domestically but internationally. The struggles in a depressed inter-war economy 
between the groups asked to share the burdens of depression are echoed in the struggles 
between rival financial groups in Britain, France and Germany over the investment 
opportunities associated with reconstruction in countries like Austria and Hungary. But 
if Sayers gives limited space to those struggles and to the political background to them, 
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preferring to concentrate on clarifying technical detail and the aims and operations of 
the Bank, this is surely understandable. In a history that already occupies three volumes 
it is surely right to give priority to the outlook and influence of the Bank rather than 
stray too far into all the conflicting forces affecting its operations. 
 
The book was highly praised – it was ‘a work that will take its place among the classics’ 
(Pollard 1978: 673) – but left Sayers himself dissatisfied. He told his sister that he 
would never write another book. Nor did he. After 1976 he wrote very little but did 
deliver in 1979 the Keynes Lecture to the British Academy, returning to his favourite 
topic of Bank Rate in a survey of ‘Bank Rate in the Twentieth Century’. 
 
7   Other Activities 
 
Sayers was in great demand as an editor and as a consultant on publications. He was, for 
example, the ‘chief architect’ of the Three Banks Review, acting as editorial adviser 
from its launch in 1948 until his retirement 20 years later.3 He set the pattern of the 
review, which always carried an historical article, as well as a general economic article 
and one on a more specific industrial or commercial subject. He brought in many of the 
contributors, and contributed himself but showed a distinct preference for articles in the 
areas he prescribed over articles in his own special field of banking and finance, which 
seldom appeared. As a member of the editorial committee he is said to have been good 
company, modest about his own work, but firm over any questioning of his proposals 
                                                          
3
 His role in that capacity is the subject of a tribute by Donald Fair in the September 
1989 issue of The Royal Bank of Scotland Review, the successor to the Three Banks 
Review. 
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on policy or of his editorial standards. 
 
He was also for a time closely associated with the editorial side of Economica and was 
chairman of the British Academy’s publications committee from its inception in 1969 
until 1974. This was at a time when the finance of academic publications was becoming 
increasingly costly and difficult and it was necessary to consider subsidies and 
alternative methods of publication. Sayers’s own publishers, like the Academy’s, were 
the Oxford University Press to which he acted for many years as a consultant. 
 
Sayers was a superb lecturer, taking immense pains over his lectures and shutting 
himself up in his room beforehand, virtually to memorize his lecture before delivering 
it. Both in lecture and in conversaton he expressed himself slowly and with deliberation. 
He was always clear, concise and well within the allotted time. Latterly, however, he 
lectured less and less and from about 1963 until his retirement in 1968 gave no more 
than a few lectures each year. His weekly seminars were shared with Roger Alford, 
Leslie Pressnell, Alan Day and, for a time, Charles Goodhart. 
 
Students stood in awe of him for his eminence and erudition but felt little of the 
affection some teachers inspire. They were said to scramble at seminars for seats well 
away from him in case they were easily spotted and obliged to answer awkward 
questions. He saw each of his students briefly at the beginning and end of term and gave 
particular attention to any student whom he knew to be in personal difficulties. In the 
case of an Indian student under stress, for example, he invited him to his home in 
Sevenoaks for a weekend. But he could also be brutal in his criticism if, for example, he 
suspected a student of borrowing other people’s ideas without acknowledgement. There 
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were occasions on which Sayers’s colleagues feared that the victim might commit 
suicide and hurried to offer reassurance that the violence of the criticism reflected 
Sayers’s ill-health. 
 
Before the war Sayers had been happy to work with Barrett Whale and to mix with 
others at LSE. When he rejoined the staff in 1947 he struck up a close friendship with 
T.S. Ashton who, like Sayers, combined economics with economic history. Ashton had 
begun as an economic historian and had been tempted back to Manchester by George 
Unwin, only to find himself required to teach currency and banking, never economic 
history. He had been in the Economic History Chair at LSE for three years when Sayers 
arrived and the two soon discovered their common interests. Sayers became something 
of a protégé of Ashton who protected him and when necessary would come to his 
defence. 
 
8   Personal Relationships 
 
With other colleagues at LSE Sayers’s relations were less close. He had shown at 
Oxford a capacity to collaborate in research into business behaviour. But 
temperamentally he was a loner who preferred to get on with his work without much 
social activity. 
 
This tendency was accentuated in later life by ill-health: after a mishap on a platform at 
Leamington Spa station during the war he suffered from a bad back which obliged him 
to rest for long spells. The trouble continued and he had a bed installed in his room on 
which he rested. Apparently the ‘cushions’ between the disks in his spine were 
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disintegrating and medical science had not yet found how to control this complaint. 
Later, however, Stuart Wilson remembers the emotional occasion when Sayers came 
back from seeing his doctor who had just told him that he could look forward to a 
normal life span. Less hopeful expectations may help to account for the pace at which 
he worked in the early 1950s, turning out a book a year. 
 
When he returned after a summer vacation he once complained to a colleague that he 
had been unable to get any work done because of back trouble. Another probem was 
trouble with his throat: he used to say that he could barely last an hour’s lecturing 
because of this. Shortly before he retired he described a visit to a throat specialist who 
was unable to find the cause of the trouble but called him back as he was leaving and 
said: ‘Let me look at your shirt collar ... Yes, it’s much too tight’. 
 
It was a measure of the distance he preserved from his immediate colleagues that only 
one of them ever visited him at his home and then only in order to drive him to a 
conference at Nottingham. This was in 1970 when he had already retired and was trying 
to sell his house. Similarly, he never brought Mrs Sayers to LSE or spent much time in 
the Senior Common Room or organized any of the tea or sherry parties for students and 
staff which LSE encouraged. In the 1950s all the entertainment of money and banking 
students – especially those from abroad – and most of the visiting academics was 
undertaken by Stuart Wilson and his wife. There were periods when weeks would go 
by, nearly a whole term, without his colleagues seeing him. One of them, himself a 
distinguished monetary historian, cannot recall that Sayers ever dropped into his room 
about anything more than once or twice in eight years. It was a cause of general 
astonishment and excitement when he and his wife accepted an invitation to the 
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wedding of his secretary, Miss Adamson, in 1959. 
 
Because of his bad back and because also of his immersion in writing and research, 
Sayers’s immediate colleagues bore with the infrequency of contact with him and his 
light commitment to teaching in later years. But there were times when lack of contact 
and consultation could land colleagues in embarrassing situations out of ignorance and 
it never made for a healthy relationship. In other respects he was extremely 
conscientious: for example, in the keeping of records and preparing annual reports on 
his undergraduates. He took great trouble over his graduate students – most of them 
foreigners – and wrote personal letters of congratulation to all of them on graduation. 
 
Sayers was a man of great determination and persistence. From an early age he pursued 
the truth with question after question, maintaining that no one could establish it without 
personally examining all the evidence and rejecting hearsay. At the same time he was 
shy, diffident and withdrawn. There was, too, a prickly side to his nature that grew more 
apparent with age and made him at times somewhat autocratic (one colleague called 
him ‘The Emperor’). He could be crushing to students, colleagues, and even visiting 
speakers, defending himself on the grounds that robust argument is justifiable in 
academic debate – although the victims were not all academic. On the other hand, those 
of his colleagues who visited the United States and Australia were told of a Sayers they 
had never known – a charming man, good-humoured and good company, and one who 
left behind warm memories and deep admiration. His younger brother insists that he had 
a hidden personality as a loving and caring person of whom many who knew him were 
unaware and cites as an example his firm promise in May 1940 to his brother, then a 
Territorial in a front-line position on the South Coast, to look after his wife and children 
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should he be killed in a German invasion. 
 
He loved children and was sad that he had no grandchildren. He would brighten when 
any of his colleagues mentioned an expected addition to the family and welcome an 
opportunity to meet children brought to the School. 
 
He was himself extremely sensitive to criticism and felt that his work did not receive all 
the attention it deserved. The post-Radcliffe years put a great strain on him and, in 
consequence, on his colleagues. He took the attacks on the Report very badly and was 
unable to restrain himself at lunches and seminars in encounters even with friendly City 
critics like Wilfred King of The Banker, and W.F. Crick, Midland Bank’s Economic 
Adviser, while with others like Victor Morgan, who had severely criticized the 
Radcliffe Report in print, he would sit sullen and silent, as once occurred at a seminar 
organized by the Midland Bank. 
 
Seminars at LSE suffered in the same way. They were oriented too exclusively to 
Radcliffe doctrine and contrary approaches were given short shrift. Questions would be 
put to students, their answers taken but not necessarily debated and there would follow 
an oracular pronouncement from Sayers. He became unhelpful, too, in offering 
comment on the work of his colleagues if it diverged from his own views. 
 
Within LSE Sayers did little to resist the decline of monetary history as a subject of 
study. This was strange given his dedication to the subject and his plea in 1960 for ‘the 
systematic study of recent monetary history’ and his lament for its neglect (Sayers 1960: 
327). A history paper had been compulsory in Finals at LSE but when it was made 
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optional in the 1960s Sayers offered no support for its retention. When taught M.Sc. 
degrees were introduced in the 1960s he let the old-style written M.Sc. in monetary 
history go. Thus the place of monetary history in the curriculum was gradually whittled 
down with the acquiesence of its principal exponent. Few good students went on to 
postgraduate research and those who wanted to do so might be advised to choose 
another university for the purpose. This was all very disheartening to Sayers’s 
immediate colleagues. 
 
In the rise of model-building and econometric analysis, which marked the 
‘modernisation’ of economics at LSE (and elsewhere) in the 1960s, Sayers took no part. 
His interests were in the functioning of institutions, the framing of policy and the 
process of change. As a result there were those who came to regard him in the 1960s as 
one of yesterday’s men and could hardly wait to see him make way for a successor from 
the econometric generation. 
 
Sayers was a great traveller in and out of term and had a wide range of contacts, 
particularly with bankers, all over the Continent as well as in North America and 
Australia. This network was of great value to him and to LSE during his tenure there. 
He had some knowledge of European languages, enough at least for reading purposes, 
but less so for speaking. Frank Paish alleged that after his [Sayers’s] efforts to lecture in 
Spanish his Spanish hosts decided that future speakers should be asked to lecture in 
their native tongues. Whatever the truth of that story, when he declared his intention to 
retire early at 60 it was with the intention of teaching foreign languages. As retirement 
neared, however, he began to have second thoughts, hoping apparently that he might be 
asked to stay on after all and regretting that nobody had done so. No one for that matter 
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consulted him in any way about his eventual successor or even informed him. 
 
Even when his academic career had ended he was tempted to take the Cambridge Chair 
in Economic History. David Joslin had succeeded Michael Postan in 1965 but died 
suddenly of heart attacks in 1970 at the early age of 45. Sayers, then aged 62, seems to 
have been approached but decided not to take the appointment, writing subsequently, ‘I 
can see now what a ghastly mistake it would have been’ (private correspondence 
between Sayers and Cairncross). 
 
Sayers was elected to the British Academy in 1957 and served as Vice-President in 
1966-1967. He was especially proud of his FBA and liked the letters to be used after his 
name as evidence of his pride in that honour. In 1960 he served as President of Section 
F of the British Association. For a time in 1968 he was a part-time member of the 
Monopolies Commission. He became closely associated with the Economic History 
Society and was President from 1972-1974. A few years earlier he had tried to revive an 
editorial committee for the Economic History Review but without success, one of the 
editors indicating his unwillingness to edit under supervision. 
 
Sayers was awarded many academic honours. The Universities of Warwick and Kent 
conferred honorary degrees on him and the University of Cambridge would have liked 
to do so too. He at first agreed but was unable, because of illness, to attend the 
ceremony and when approached a second time in the following year he for some reason 
declined the honour. He was, however, an Honorary Fellow of his old Cambridge 
college, St Catherine’s, and an Honorary Fellow also of LSE and of the Institute of 
Bankers. After the publication of The Bank of England he was offered but refused a 
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knighthood (on the curious grounds that he could not possibly give an answer within 24 
hours). 
 
Music, art and walking were his main non-academic interests. He was an avid concert-
goer and after he retired he was able to indulge more fully his interest in listening to 
music. His letters were full of comments on the London musical scene. 
 
For most of his life, in spite of his back trouble, Sayers was basically a healthy and 
vigorous man. He enjoyed long walks and even after his hips started bothering him – he 
suffered latterly from arthritis – he would walk for hours over rough country. According 
to his daughter, he would climb anything in the Alps that did not require 
mountaineering equipment. Towards the end of his life, however, various complaints 
added up and in his last few years he was almost completely immobile. 
 
9   Conclusion 
 
Cairncross’s final conclusions were that with Sayers’s death the UK had lost 
 
an authoritative guide to British banking, the author of a textbook read for a generation 
in successive editions all over the world, and an outstanding contributor to banking 
history. More than anyone, he was the source of the doctrines associated with the 
Radcliffe Committee. His former pupils came to occupy positions of eminence in many 
countries and included, it is said, 19 Ministers of Finance (Cairncross 1991: 560-561). 
 
Cairncross’s original memoir was published in 1991; with the further passage of time, 
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over 25 years since then, Sayers’s standing and reputation as an economic historian 
remains undimmed. Anyone seeking to study and research UK monetary and financial 
developments between about 1890 and 1945 is bound to profit by reading Sayers’s 
accounts of the British banking and financial system during this period. But his 
approach to current monetary policy analysis has fallen into disuse, perhaps too much 
so. His textbook, Modern Banking, once read by every undergraduate in this field, is no 
longer cited. Sayers’s focus on liquidity rather than any particular monetary aggregate, 
which formed the centrepiece of the Radcliffe Report, was widely scorned during the 
heyday of monetarism. However, perhaps it may be regarded with somewhat greater 
appreciation nowadays with the development of ‘shadow banking’, money market 
mutual funds, and the abandonment by many central banks, especially the US Federal 
Reserve, of any focus on, or major attention to, monetary quantities. 
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